Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 144 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 145 - Pre-sentence drug testing

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 652, in
clause 145, page 81, line 11, leave out '14' and insert '18'.
 We move on to the extension of pre-sentence drug testing to people aged between 14 and 18. The clause opens up some serious questions about the Government's view of how young people are best treated for drug addiction or potential drug addiction. That extension goes beyond existing arrangements for intervention and appropriate treatment for youngsters in that age group. There is no obvious reason why it should be extended to what is effectively a criminal sanction, and it certainly will be a criminal sanction if 14 and 15-year-olds refuse to accept compulsory testing under such circumstances. 
 It is not clear that a treatment regime will be prescribed as a result, other than the sanctions imposed through sentencing. Many people feel that the right treatment at that stage cannot be given through a sentencing process, but that it can be achieved only through a health process. We need to ensure that if young people in that age group have a difficulty with substances, they are given effective treatment rather than having sanctions imposed on them. 
 It is not clear whether the rights of the child, as prescribed under the United Nations convention, are circumscribed in any way. We must ask whether the Government have a clear view of an age of majority in that area. I find it confusing that so many ages are prescribed in different parts of the Bill and in other legislation that have a level of responsibility commensurate with adulthood. I cannot see a coherent rationale behind the proposal, and the Government have adduced no arguments for it. 
 We believe that what is appropriate for a 14-year-old is not appropriate for an adult. Even with the accelerating growth in maturity of young people, and their increasing predilection in some circumstances to such addictions, there is still a difference between childhood and adulthood. I do not understand where the Government are coming from; the way in which they discriminate between children and adults shows muddled thinking. 
 By extending the drug testing provisions and creating another offence for which children can be punished, either by fine or by imprisonment, we risk adding yet another criminal sanction. I will be plain 
 about it: that is not appropriate. The Minister must explain why he thinks that it is appropriate. 
 Finally, the provision provides scope for discrimination between the young person who has experimented once and is found to test positive and the young person who has a problem with the continuous addictive use of a banned substance. That discrimination should be dealt with. 
 I would be much happier if there were a proper programme of treatment for young people who were found to have a drugs problem that was one of the contributing factors to their involvement in other offences. I do not see that in the Government's proposals; I see simply a regime that may lay an additional level of criminality on a young person without the proper remedy to help them out of a life of addiction. The lack of therapeutic effect of what is proposed in subsection (1) and the simple assertion that it is a path worth following mean that I find it difficult to support the Government's proposals.

Graham Allen: Good morning, Mr. Illsley. What a joy it must be to be the Member of Parliament for Somerton and Frome. There, up to the age of 18 girls sport pigtails and boys go about in short trousers, school cap skew-whiff, carrying their catapult in their back pocket. Sadly, it is not quite like that in Nottingham, North, where some are hardened offenders by the age of 18. It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman nor the Minister that I do not consider the 18 of the amendment or the 14 of the clause to be appropriate—I will not detain the Committee by rehearsing the arguments. If someone is arrested and tried and is awaiting sentence, the age of 10 is appropriate for offenders who will be on class A drugs. This is not smoking behind the bike sheds in a ''Just William'' story; this is people whose life will be completely wrecked. We are talking about people who engage in criminality, probably for the rest of their life, to feed their habit. It will help those people to get hold of them at the earliest possible age. I fully appreciate the hon. Gentleman's sentiment, but he is not helping those young people by helping them to avoid proper drugs testing at the appropriate time.
 The Minister very kindly said in an earlier debate that the Department was in touch with the Nottinghamshire police about the issue. At the time, I raised the possibility that since the Secretary of State has reserved powers in this matter, he might consider a pilot scheme somewhere in the United Kingdom. I know that the Nottinghamshire police force would be up for that pilot scheme. Perhaps in his reply the Minister will assure me that the issue is being pursued and that it will, once the Bill becomes law, be possible for the Secretary of State to set up one or two pilots in which youngsters from 10 onwards—not 14 onwards—are tested so that we can help them and help also to reduce drug-related crime in that age group dramatically.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) highlighted an important issue, as did the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). I have no difficulty with the principle of pre-sentence drug testing for young offenders, but I am concerned about
 what it is intended to lead to. Either it will be part of a national programme to tackle drug addiction that is picked up in young offenders at the time of sentencing, or it will be a pointless bureaucratic overlay to the sentencing process, which, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome rightly pointed out, could criminalise people who do not comply. My difficulty with the clause is not its intention but the way in which it will work.
 As the Minister will have seen, our amendments suggest taking the opposite direction from that advocated by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and widening the scope of the orders to include other drugs besides class A drugs. There are two poles to the way in which this issue can be viewed. At one is the attitude that there is no point in doing anything, because even if testing is carried out, it will lead nowhere. However, if that is the case I should prefer there to be no clause at all. If something constructive is to be done, I should go to the other pole and say that I can see no reason to confine the testing to class A drugs. 
 We have a serious problem in this country. From the evidence that I have seen in the past 12 months, it seems that there is a clear link between drug abuse and crime. Furthermore, the level of drug abuse in some areas of the country, particularly by young teenagers, is very high. One need only go to Camberwell to see the problems of young people who turn up at Kids Company to realise that cannabis addiction is starting at 11 or 12. Those running Kids Company take the view that it is often used for a sedative effect, which may actually reduce the crime level in the locality, although it is a symptom of serious social and personal problems for those who abuse it.

John Mann: Can the hon. Gentleman cite any evidence such as a research study or a medical trial from anywhere in the world that shows a link between a non-class A drug and acquisitive crimes?

Dominic Grieve: I simply say this: the hon. Gentleman might want to go to Kids Company and talk to the staff. The whole point of Kids Company is to keep young people off the streets and out of crime, and it is successful at doing it while they are attending. However, those who go there are often the ones who have been committing a large proportion of the street crime in the Camberwell area; I think that that view is supported by the Home Office's study of what happens there. Most of them are addicted to cannabis—leaving aside the question of any other substance abuse.
 Whether there is a correlation between those youngsters' acquisitive crime and their cannabis use I am not prepared to say. The cheapness and ready availability of cannabis suggest that it may not be necessary to commit crime to obtain the money to pay for it. Buying cocaine or heroin is different in that respect. However, there is a clear correlation in my mind between the dysfunctionality of childhood that is giving rise to regular cannabis use by adolescents, and lifestyles so chaotic that those young people also commit crime. I go no further than that.

John Mann: I repeat the question. Can the hon. Gentleman cite any evidence that the use of non-class A drugs such as cannabis—on which subject he will know I am not a liberal—has any correlation with acquisitive crime? In addition, can he cite any evidence to suggest that addiction in relation to cannabis is nicotine addiction? Pure nicotine addiction could be an addiction in the same way for an 11-year-old. I would regard that as equally serious. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman does.

Dominic Grieve: I am sure that nicotine addiction can be a serious problem for the health of young people. From visits that I have made abroad, particularly to Boston in the United States, a picture unfolds of an entirely different public attitude to the problem of cannabis addiction in the young. There, it is seen as a serious public health problem. If a 15 or 16-year-old who has a cannabis addiction commits an offence, one option is for them to be treated in a residential rehabilitation centre, just as if they were a class A drug addict.

David Cameron: It is important to get our terms right. Talking about being ''addicted to cannabis'' is a slight misuse of language. Cannabis is not physically addictive, whereas nicotine is, and most cannabis is taken with tobacco. One should talk about ''a cannabis habit'', which can be very damaging.

Dominic Grieve: With regret, I disagree with my hon. Friend. People can be addicted to all sorts of things, such as drinking vast quantities of tea or coffee. If someone has a psychological dependency that interferes with their health, that is an addiction. Anyone who drinks six or seven mugs of coffee in the morning knows that doing so has physical consequences.

Paul Stinchcombe: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Dominic Grieve: Let me continue. I have clearly sparked a fuse.
 From the evidence of my visits to the United States, I know that cannabis use is regarded there as a psychological addiction, which has serious health consequences for the user. I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) in so far as I accept that cannabis use is unlike crack cocaine use, because in the case of crack cocaine, there are clear signs of physical addiction, as, indeed, there are in the case of heroin.

David Cameron: No. It is terribly important to get this right. It is true that one can be addicted to shopping or tea, but there is a difference between a physical addiction—the strongest form of which is an addiction to heroin or other opiates, although one can also be physically addicted to nicotine or caffeine—and a mental or psychological addiction, such as in the case of cannabis. There is no medical evidence for physical addiction to crack cocaine, but there is very strong evidence for high psychological addiction. I am sorry to be a pedant, but it is important to get the terms right.

Dominic Grieve: I do not find my hon. Friend in any way pedantic and I am prepared to accept what he says, but
 I disagree with him about consequences. It does not matter whether one has a physical or psychological addiction to a drug, if the consequence of the psychological addiction is that one is repeatedly driven to take that drug because of one's psychological need, and if the drug has a physical influence on the person while it is in his system. I think that my hon. Friend will agree that someone is in a different physical condition after he has smoked cannabis from that which he was in before. That is evidenced by the fact that he is unsafe to operate machinery or to drive because his cognitive functions are impaired. In the United States, a distinction is not made because smoking cannabis is regarded as a public health problem.

Paul Stinchcombe: So that we can have a properly informed debate, will the hon. Gentleman table all the evidence that he has seen that demonstrates that cannabis is addictive, so that we can scrutinise it?

Dominic Grieve: I say to the hon. Gentleman that I have seen plenty of evidence—[Interruption.] I shall explain to the hon. Gentleman. I am fascinated by this debate, because a modest proposal in relation to testing has taken off into a major debate. Perhaps I can reassure Labour Members. My purpose in tabling the amendment has nothing to do with the question whether cannabis should be a class B or a class A drug—[Interruption.] I apologise if we are still discussing amendment No. 652. I thought that we were on amendment No. 624.

Eric Illsley: Order. We are still on amendment No. 652

Dominic Grieve: I apologise to the Committee—I was getting carried away with my own enthusiasm.

Humfrey Malins: I just want to bring the debate back to the nuts and bolts. Would my hon. Friend accept the proposition—if it has anything to do with what we are talking about—that those youngsters who abuse class B drugs, whether that be through amphetamines, glue sniffing or cannabis, are more likely to be part of a fraternity that is connected with crime, and therefore much more on the conveyor belt towards acquisitive crime, which comes from the move on to the next drug, than they would be otherwise?

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I agree, although I apologise to the Committee for being carried away. The two issues that he mentioned are linked. The discussion was prompted by the amendment that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome tabled, so I do not think that it is illegitimate to run the two issues together. However, I apologise to the hon. Gentleman that I should have widened the scope beyond what he was trying to achieve. I do not agree with his amendment, for reasons that have become fairly clear, although I was trying to highlight the notion—I agree with him on this—that there is no point in starting down that road unless that leads to proper rehabilitation being made available. I shall return to that issue in the next set of amendments. If we are going down that road properly, it would be well worth picking up whether young offenders have a problem with a class B drug, although without
 criminalising them, because the matter is a public health issue of great importance, which is taken seriously in countries such as the United States. Opportunities are made available to such young people for proper rehabilitation that, unfortunately, we simply do not have in this country.
 I am not prepared to accept the principle that cannabis is an innocuous substance. We have gone down that road and may come back to it. Cannabis might be only psychologically addictive, but the consequences of that psychological addiction are immensely destructive. Furthermore, as I suspect my hon. Friend the Member for Witney would agree, there is clear evidence that repeated cannabis use can have serious health consequences, by causing psychosis.

David Cameron: I just want to clarify that I do not disagree about consequences—I did not even mention them. I have spent a lot of time on the Select Committee on Home Affairs, and for the benefit of the Committee I wanted to define the difference between mental addiction and physical addiction, and make sure that the right drug was in the right category. That was all that I wanted my hon. Friend to be clear about, and was the sole purpose of my pedantry.

Dominic Grieve: As I said to my hon. Friend, he was not being pedantic, and I am grateful to him for clarifying that matter. From my work practising as a barrister and the work that I have been doing over the past 12 months, I am perfectly aware of the difference between a psychological and a physical addiction. However, from the point of the view of the consequences to the user, my opinion is that although there might be differences in treatment, the damage that is done to the individual if they are addicted psychologically or physically can ultimately be similar, in terms of the destruction of their life. That is why picking up whether 14-year-olds have a class B drug problem such as cannabis might be equally valuable if we can provide proper help for them.
 Coming back to the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, I have explained my position on that, which is that as I have just enough residual faith that the Government will try to do something about class A drug addiction, the provision might be of value. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is right that, unless that provision exists—at the moment it does not—it has no value.

Paul Stinchcombe: So that we can debate this on a properly informed basis rather than through bias, can the hon. Gentleman supply us with any evidence that the use of cannabis is immensely destructive?

Dominic Grieve: If the hon. Gentleman seriously believes that regular use of cannabis—

Paul Stinchcombe: Immensely destructive.

Dominic Grieve: Yes it is immensely destructive. One only has to meet people who have been regular cannabis users to recognise the way in which it has destroyed their life. I accept that occasional, recreational use might be harmless, but I do not
 accept—on the evidence of people whom I have spoken to and seen—that that is the case in relation to regular use. I have only to think of the parents who came to my surgery last week and described their son's schizophrenia. He was hospitalised at the age of 23 with serious psychotic problems, entirely triggered by cannabis use at university.
 If the hon. Gentleman is going to tell me that there is no clear evidence of the link between cannabis use and psychosis, when it is well documented in medical literature, we are on different planets.

Paul Stinchcombe: On the broader argument, I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The greatest indicator as to whether someone will be a heroin addict when he is 25 is whether, at the age of 15, he plays truant and smokes cigarettes. I simply suggest that it is damaging to use terminology in a misleading way and to suggest that cannabis is both addictive and immensely harmful when it is relatively harmless and largely used by law-abiding—[Interruption.]

Eric Illsley: Order. We are involving ourselves in a clause stand part debate instead of debating amendment No. 652. The Committee is anticipating the next group of amendments. If we are to have a debate on the merits of class A drugs, cannabis or any other substance, it should come within the appropriate group of amendments and I would advise the Committee to dispose of this amendment before moving to a more general debate.

Dominic Grieve: I am conscious that the cats have started to miaow. In the circumstances—

Desmond Turner: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Dominic Grieve: Of course I shall give way. I was not intending to raise passions on the amendment. I am sorry that I ran the amendments together, although they have a logical link. I shall return to my own amendments in a cool and dispassionate way in a moment.

Desmond Turner: As a simple non-lawyer, I am at a loss to see how the hon. Gentleman's amendments have any relevance to the arguments that he has been putting to us. What is the advantage of changing the age at which a test is taken from 14 to 18? The hon. Gentleman has made it clear that he is concerned about much younger people becoming involved in drug abuse. I do not see the relevance, and I would appreciate it if he could explain what the amendments contribute.

Dominic Grieve: I shall return to them when we consider the next group. I made the point that they were probing amendments designed to look at the range of options open to the Government.

Eric Illsley: There are no probing amendments. The hon. Gentleman is addressing only amendment No. 652. As I said, we should deal with that before we move on.

Dominic Grieve: I have made my points on amendment No. 652, and we can pursue the discussion on the next amendments, which I tabled.

Ian Lucas: Briefly, I am strongly against the Liberal amendment, No. 652, and I want to clarify why.
 In the late 1980s, I worked as a solicitor in Birkenhead and dealt with a great number of young, heroin-addicted offenders who regularly appeared before the courts. Subsection (1) reminded me specifically of one 14-year-old, who had committed more than 20 dwellinghouse burglaries. It was important for a court dealing with that child—that is what he was—to be as fully informed as possible. 
 As it happened, that child had a family—he had a very supportive mother, who used to come to court. She presented evidence that he was, indeed, a heroin addict. In due course, that led to his receiving assistance with his habit. However, the first step that any individual who is addicted to a class A drug must take is to accept that they have a habit. When dealing with children, the court should be made aware as early as possible of the existence of such a habit.

David Heath: I do not disagree with the points that the hon. Gentleman is making, but were his clients not referred to a youth offending team? Was there no analysis of their potential behaviour, including substance abuse? Were not such reports part of the pre-sentence reporting procedure—even without the provision in the Bill?

Ian Lucas: A reference may indeed have been made, but there was no specific independent assessment or knowledge of whether the individual that I mentioned was a drug addict, and that is precisely what subsection (1) will allow the court to have. For the life of me, I cannot see how it would prejudice the best interests of a child defendant for the courts to be made aware of the considerable problem that he has.

Graham Allen: Would my hon. Friend, with his great experience, accept that he might not even have encountered that child at the age of 14 had the child been able to take a simple swab test at the age of 10?

Ian Lucas: That may indeed be the case. My experience does not stretch as far as 10-year-olds, but I know that the problem has been getting worse since the time when I was practising. There may be a case for lowering the age, but there is no case whatever for the amendment.

Hilary Benn: I confess that I have not been briefed to debate the addictive qualities, or otherwise, of tea, although I must admit to some personal experience—[Interruption.] No, I will not take any interventions on that point.
 We have ranged so widely in debating the amendment that I find it hard to conceive of further arguments that might be brought to bear when we finally get to amendment No. 624. Indeed, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) might want to say, ''I draw the Committee's attention to the remarks that I made a moment ago.'' 
 In essence, we are revisiting an issue that we debated at considerable length on clauses 9 and 10. It might be helpful in disposing of the amendment if we remind ourselves of what we are talking about. 
 First, the penalty for refusing to take the test does not involve imprisonment; it is a fine, so there are no grounds for the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. 
 Secondly, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North may have noticed that subsection (7) allows the Secretary of State to substitute a different age for that set out in the current provisions, which is 14. As drafted, the clause would not permit a pilot for a younger age group, but the Government take the view that 14 is the appropriate age, for all the reasons that I gave when we debated the issue before. However, we want to reflect on experience, and if a case is made for altering the age, the Bill will give us the power to do so. 
 In essence, subsection (1) is about enabling the court, when considering passing a community sentence, to try if it wishes to get some up-to-date information about class A drug use. That is what we seek to achieve—no more, no less. Why do we specify class A drugs? We do so for all the reasons that have been given in the debate, which were mentioned again in our most recent exchanges. The evidence is absolutely clear: those drugs do a lot of harm, and there is a clear link between class A drug use and acquisitive crime, which is what the provisions attempt to address. 
 The circumstances will vary: it may have been some time since an offender was first arrested and a drug test was done at that point; there may be some doubt about whether the offender is continuing to use drugs; or the court may wish to supplement the work of the youth offending team, done under the advice and support services for education and training—ASSET—scheme, with a more up-to-date assessment of whether drug use is a continuing problem. It is done at the discretion of the court. For reasons that were powerfully put by my hon. Friends, it is intended to assist in dealing with the imprisonment of young drug addicts over the age of 14. 
 The arguments made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome for the need to ensure appropriate treatment were absolutely right. We have already made it clear—we will doubtless come back to the point when we reach clause 160—that when a court imposes a community sentence, it can make a range of disposals. Imposing a requirement for drug rehabilitation will clearly depend on the availability of appropriate treatment in the area. We realise that, and more money is being invested to ensure that it is available. 
 It is a modest but extremely sensible provision. It is wholly consistent, in its purpose and its age range, with clause 10, which we have already debated. I recognise the differing views of the Committee, but the Government are clear that we have chosen the appropriate age.

Dominic Grieve: Will the Minister explain, on the assumption that a class A drug is detected, what would be the consequences, in terms of the help or otherwise that is to be provided to the young person?

Hilary Benn: The most obvious one, under clause 160(1)(i), which we shall debate later, is that the court could decide to impose a drug rehabilitation requirement as part of the community sentence. That is the purpose. Clause 145 would allow the court access to the latest information, if it wishes to have it, when taking a decision about the appropriate disposal of a case.

David Heath: I am going to set aside the remarks of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield on his amendment, Mr. Illsley, because I think that you were quite right to suggest that they were a little premature.

Humfrey Malins: But effective.

David Heath: However effective or otherwise they may have been, they were not in order.
 I respect the position taken by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas), and I am grateful for his comments. However, my concern is ensure that value is added to the process—that proper rehabilitation and treatment will be available for young people who find themselves taking class A drugs. Although the Minister's response has given me some satisfaction, we shall have to wait to discover whether the sort of assistance that is needed will be provided. 
 The hon. Member for Nottingham, North always seems to patronise everyone who happens not to live in Nottingham's inner city. He gives a Raymond Chandler gloss to the mean streets of Nottingham, as if the rest of us know nothing of crime and its consequences. He ought to get out more, because crime affects the whole country. It affects towns small and large, villages and cities, and there is ample research to show that no part of the country is immune from the problems, and that children are exposed to drugs at school at a very young age. 
 My county council and I engaged in some interesting research with the Home Office to look at the presence of drugs in Somerset schools. It showed that there was practically no difference between Somerset schools and city schools in the access that their pupils had to narcotics. That came as a salutary piece of evidence. If I were to mention that, on the edge of my constituency, we have the Glastonbury festival nearly annually, the hon. Gentleman may understand that there is a certain amount of drug use in my constituency. I hope that he will not patronise me by pretending that problems exist in his constituency only.

Ian Lucas: Does not that make the amendment even more difficult to understand?

David Heath: Not at all. Let me be clear: I also believe in listening to professionals who work daily with children in my constituency. I said that I respected the hon. Gentleman because he has had that experience. I also respect the views of organisations such as Barnardo's and The Children's Society that work daily with children who take drugs. When such organisations express their concerns about subsection (1), those concerns should be properly debated in Committee, and the Minister should properly respond to them. Amendment No. 652, among others, was tabled on the basis of such
 organisations' submissions in order to probe the Government's intentions.
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that there are serious arguments to be made. My concern is to compare the value added by this process to the youth offending team's analysis of the behaviour of a child on charge, its reports and the programme of rehabilitation that it may be able to organise. I hope that the Government are taking the problem seriously and that they will ensure that all children covered by subsection (1) have an appropriate programme of rehabilitation backed up by medical and other support that they need to ensure that, by the time they are a little older, they will not be prey to addictive drugs and will have lost the crime habit that so often accompanies drug use. I have been explicit over the years in saying that there is a close connection between the two. 
 I intend to withdraw the amendment, but we need to witness the effectiveness of the legislation in ensuring that every child in this position receives guidance and help. They are still children. I am sorry, but however aberrant a 14-year-old's behaviour is, he or she is still in my book a child in need of guidance and help. The effectiveness of local government in providing the help that those individuals need will be the test of whether the legislation works. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 624, in
clause 145, page 81, line 14, leave out 'specified Class A'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 677, in 
clause 145, page 81, line 14, leave out 'Class A'.
 No. 678, in 
clause 145, page 81, leave out lines 39 and 40 and insert 
 ' ''specified drug'' means a drug which is a specified class A drug for the purposes of Part 3 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c.43) or which is specified by an order made by the Secretary of State.'.

Dominic Grieve: As may have been apparent from my having jumped the gun earlier, the purpose of amendments Nos. 624, 677 and 678 is to allow the Secretary of State to nominate other than class A drugs for testing. It is as simple as that. Amendment No. 624 is a probing amendment designed to elicit from the Minister a justification for confining testing to class A drugs and to give the community an opportunity to consider whether it would be valuable to ascertain whether somebody is taking other drugs when he is due to come up before the court.
 I add to my previous comments by saying to the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Dr. Turner) that the amendment has nothing to do with the amendments about ages 16 and 17, which feature in the next group. He was jumping the gun as much as I was. I shall leave those ages until the next group of amendments. 
 May I recapitulate? The view that I have always taken—and I should be interested in the views of other hon. Members—is that people may be addicted to a large number of substances, including class B drugs and other drugs besides class A drugs, and that dependence on their regular use may well be a sign of psychological problems that need to be addressed, in the context of crime. If proper treatment and rehabilitation can be provided, there is a value to ascertaining whether such people have the drugs in their system. That is the point. It has nothing to do with whether cannabis use should be treated as criminal. The issue is one of public health, about whether a problem needs to be dealt with in the context of the person's criminality, once they have been found guilty of an offence. 
 I do not accept the argument that the issues are so unrelated to whether someone commits crime that they are irrelevant. If someone commits crime and is dependent on alcohol, there is a link, in my view. If someone commits crime and has a psychological dependence on the regular use of cannabis, that needs to be dealt with as a public health issue. As I said earlier, other countries take a more serious approach and provide help to those who are—my hon. Friend the Member for Witney will have to forgive me, but this is the word I use—addicted. I accept his point about the distinction between physical and psychological addiction, but it is still addiction, and it is still a problem for society that needs to be tackled. The question is how best to do that. 
 I accept that there may be arguments that for the particular purpose of the clause we should confine testing to class A drugs. However, if the purpose of the clause is to provide help where it is needed to those who come before the courts and about whom there is evidence of drug addiction, confining it to class A drugs may be a mistake. If it is revealed that a person is addicted to a class B substance such as cannabis—or indeed a class C substance such as cannabis—that is an important issue for the court to take into account in deciding on the proper sentence. It has nothing to do with anyone's view about the legalisation or otherwise of cannabis, or about its prevalence or the possibility of its being used in a social context without harm. Alcohol can be used in a social context without harm, and most members of the Committee probably do that quite often. Many people's lives are destroyed by alcohol and they need help for their addiction to it.

John Mann: The hon. Gentleman missed a golden opportunity to table a far more effective probing amendment, and I am surprised at him. His amendment misses the point of the clause. The question of coercion comes into play in relation to potential consequences—reducing crime and influencing the offender's well-being. It seems absurd to me to think that expanding what is proposed—and in essence setting up a research base showing what substances, including nicotine, people take—would lead to preventive measures through community service.
 There is a correlation between teenage nicotine use and future criminal activity. That is researched and demonstrable. I have a researcher who is drawing 
 together every major piece of work on this subject in the English language, and several in translation, as a resource base of medical evidence on addiction. A great deal of what is claimed is wholly inaccurate. However, there is no evidence to suggest that nicotine is the most addictive substance or that it requires treatment to have an impact on crime. That is the point. A better amendment would have been to leave out the word ''may'' in line 2 and insert the word ''will''. Perhaps the Minister will consider that. 
 In the Netherlands—a country that has a very liberal view on drugs—drugs testing for offenders is compulsory; there is no ''may'', there is ''will''. They believe that there is a direct correlation between an offender's criminal act and his use of class A drugs. It is not just a question of a research base of what might be possible; it relates directly to the treatment options and the community sentences.

Dominic Grieve: Can the hon. Gentleman help the Committee? For what drugs are people compulsorily tested in the Netherlands?

John Mann: I cannot give a definitive list, but there is a clear separation between testing for hard drugs and for soft drugs. That may or may not assist the Committee, as the classification for amphetamines, for example, may be different in the Netherlands. There is demonstrable evidence that addiction to the two main drugs linked to crime in this country, crack cocaine and heroin, can be successfully treated; although ''success'' may be defined in various ways. One of the problems in this country has been the lack of drugs testing, so I wholly oppose the amendment. However, I hope that the Minister will consider whether the word ''may'' is too loose; we should consider saying that we ''will'' categorically test for class A drugs.

David Heath: We have already had half the debate, so there is no point in going over old ground. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield made an important point that he somewhat dulled by his assertions on cannabis, which were questioned by the hon. Member for Witney and others. They were unhelpful in the prosecution of his case. There was a moment of danger that in a Committee dominated by lawyers the medics would have their revenge and subject him to long discourses on physical and psychological addictions, which, if I remembered entirely my neurophysiology, I could attempt to do. However, that would not help the Committee.
 The Minister must ponder whether a 14-year-old should undergo drugs testing. It seems curious that it is then limited to class A drugs when there are other drugs of choice that are equally damaging to the health and well-being of a child. Alcohol is the most serious drug of all.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman pre-empts the question that I was about to ask him. Alcohol is an important factor in crime that should be considered. If somebody with a record of offences committed under the influence of alcohol comes before the court, the court ought to take that into account and to highlight the need to go beyond confining oneself merely to class A drugs.

David Heath: I entirely agree. We come back to the purpose of the provision. Is the point is to guarantee the future welfare of the individual and to ensure that, as far as possible, help is given to break the pattern of behaviour that has led a person into committing an offence? If so, and the consumption of a drug, whether it be alcohol or amphetamines—something that is not a specified class A drug—is a contributory factor, the solution offered by the Bill is incomplete. Will the Minister explain the rationale? Does he not believe that it is important to treat other substances, and that the court should take them into consideration in arriving at an appropriate sentence? If not, why not?
 I do not seek to diminish the importance or the increased risk to health of class A drugs—far from it; I have no doubt about it. Equally, I know that the consumption of other drugs leads to patterns of behaviour that are damaging to the individual, and that might encourage him into committing offences. Alcohol is probably the worst offender in that respect, certainly worse than cannabis. The Minister must explain why he has chosen to limit the scope of his proposals in such a way.

Humfrey Malins: My arguments will be brief, but they will be powerful, and I hope that the Minister will accept them.
 What is the purpose of limiting the search to class A drugs? The clause says that a court that is considering passing a community sentence may make an order to ascertain whether the offender has a drug in his body—not class B or class C, but class A only. Why limit it? I do not see the point. It might be helpful for the court to make an order to see whether a class B or class C drug is in his system. What is the harm in the amendment? 
 I hope that the Minister will address absolutely specifically my next point. A defendant appears before the court having driven his car in a wild and strange fashion through Wandsworth. When the police breathalyse him, they are gobsmacked because there is not the slightest sign of alcohol in his body. However, they put two and two together and make four. He is arrested and charged with driving while under the influence of drink or drugs. The sample reveals that his body contains class B drugs. If the Minister wants me to list them, I have a case in mind and I shall do so. The sample comes back and he pleads guilty—a week, a month or several weeks later, depending on the case. What does the court do? 
 The court might have it in mind to pass a community sentence. Driving while under the influence of drugs is an offence under the Road Traffic Acts—the offence is not limited to class A drugs. The court, wanting to make a community sentence order for the benefit of the defendant and of society, finds that the defendant's analysis shows that his body contained class B and class C drugs that affected his driving so that he was guilty of the offence, but no class A drugs. What is it to do?

David Cameron: I want to make the briefest of contributions, having listened carefully to my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and having sat on the Home Affairs Committee. Can cannabis use be
 connected to offending behaviour? Yes, it can, in some circumstances. As my hon. Friend said quite persuasively, it can be part of a lifestyle that is perhaps relevant. Can it be relevant to understanding the need of the youngster in front of the court? Yes, it can. My hon. Friend made a persuasive case for that. On the basis of what I have said my times in Committee—that the relevant information should be put in front of the court—I am not that unhappy with the amendment. However, I want to make two points that I hope the Minister can respond to.
 First, will the courts understand whether the cannabis use has anything to do with the offending? I am all for putting the information in front of the courts. My hon. Friend tells me always to beware of batty judges. Here I turn his words back on him: will the judge and the court understand that there is any connection between the possibility that the young man has done something wrong and the possibility that he is also an occasional cannabis user? It is also worth thinking for a second of a possible case in which someone appears in front of the court for, say, a minor public order offence, such as over-exuberance at the boat race or a football match. If that chap happens to have had a little bit of cannabis some weeks before and that fact comes out, as it would under the amendment, is that relevant to the court? Is that fair on the young person in question? He has done something wrong, such as committing an offence at a football match, he is in front of the court, the court is being told about it, he is going to be punished for it, and then suddenly it becomes public that this guy has taken cannabis, maybe only once in his whole life, two weeks before. Is that fair on that person? It has nothing to do with his offending behaviour. We must consider that point. 
 My second point, which might be significant, although I might have got it entirely wrong, is that we must think about how long each drug stays in the body. That has not been mentioned at all. Cannabis stays in the body for many weeks. Class A drugs get out of the body very quickly. I am slightly concerned. If we accept the amendment, what message will we send to the offender who is a cannabis user? If they are fully aware of the amendment, they might be tempted to stop using cannabis before they go to court, and if they feel that they want to take a drug, they might start using something harder that gets out of the body more quickly. 
 We know that that happens in prison. When there is a testing regime, inmates know that cannabis stays in the body longer, so they are driven—by choice—to taking class A drugs. That is one of the reasons for the class A problem in prison. I fear that my hon. Friend's amendment, well moved and argued as it was, does not address that point. I shall be interested to know what the Minister's reflections are on that point.

Hilary Benn: I shall endeavour to respond to all the points that have been raised in this interesting debate. I shall come on to the central thrust of the argument of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) raised the may/must issue. It might be helpful if I remind hon.
 Members that a community order, which the court can decide to specify under clause 160, can include a drug rehabilitation requirement that provides for compulsory testing. In other words, as soon as the court—[Interruption.] Well, it is after; I appreciate that. My hon. Friend made a point about ensuring that there is continued adherence to the requirements of the drug rehabilitation order. Compulsory testing is provided for as part of that regime, and that is specified in clause 189.
 In the case of the real life example cited by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), a drug rehabilitation order, which is available to the court under these arrangements, can be made. It can apply to any drug use. I hope that that answers his point. He will see that clause 189(2)(a)(i) states that 
''A court may not impose a drug rehabilitation requirement unless it is satisfied that the offender is dependent on, or has a propensity to misuse, drugs''.
 That covers the example.

Humfrey Malins: But I assume that it means exactly what I said it means, namely that the court in the scenario that I envisaged cannot order a drugs test on the defendant.

Hilary Benn: As I understood the hon. Gentleman's example, the evidence of the drugs was already before the court. In weighing that up, it could decide under clause 189 to make a drug rehabilitation requirement, which can apply to a propensity to misusing drugs in general. I hope that that eventuality has been catered for. I can see that the hon. Gentleman is not satisfied, but I think that that deals with the case that he described.
 The clause also provides the opportunity for the type of specified class A drug to be widened by order of the Secretary of State. That will give us greater flexibility should other drugs come onto the scene that—we learn from evidence—have a close correlation with acquisitive crime. 
 In giving the example that he gave in disagreeing with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, the hon. Member for Witney made a good argument as to why it would not be sensible to extend the provision in the way that the amendment proposes. However, the principal argument against the amendment is the one that has run as a thread throughout our debates on drugs. The clause focuses on class A drugs because the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that that is the group of drugs that has the closest link with acquisitive crime and offending. We have heard that from hon. Members of all parties who, in different constituencies with different make-ups, are conscious of the problems that it creates. The case for the clause is that it is designed to focus effort where it can really make a difference: it requires us to concentrate on users of a certain class of drugs, the imprisonment of whom will make the biggest impact on crime and therefore on the communities that all of us represent.

Dominic Grieve: I am always conscious that, as it says on the firework, having lit the blue touch paper one should retire. Perhaps I stayed too close to the firework when it started to go off. I am grateful to
 the Minister for his answers, and I do not disagree with the points that he has put. As the debate has gone on, there has been a closer meeting of minds on some issues. Equally, some Committee members seem to have made a blind assumption as soon as I mentioned the word cannabis that I was about to argue about it in the wider way in which we have done in Parliament over the past three years. Rationality does not often come into that discussion.
 My concern is that clause 145, as the Minister has said, is linked intimately to the making of the community sentence order, as set out in clause 160. It has both purpose and value. Its purpose is to ensure that somebody is punished or restrained. Underlying it—this is something that I consider to be very valuable—is the idea that the problems affecting the life of the person concerned may be addressed, especially if they are seen as having a link with his offending. I entirely accept the Minister's point about concentrating on class A drugs because of their close correlation with acquisitive crime—people who are addicted to them have to spend a lot of money to get them—because whether people are addicted to crack cocaine psychologically or to heroin physically, they are likely to commit such crime. My constituency is in the Slough police district, and on the basis of evidence from Slough, the police believe that 70 per cent. of all acquisitive crime in the area is fuelled by class A drug use. I do not know whether that is absolutely correct, but I have no difficulty accepting the scale of the problem associated with class A drugs. 
 That said, I am also concerned that the problem of addiction among young children to a range of substances that have a negative effect on their lives is not being properly addressed in this country. That may be partly because we have a primary health care system, because the situation here is in sharp contrast to that which exists in some other countries, including the United States, the Netherlands and Sweden. It is a matter not of whether drug use is criminalised, but whether it is picked up through the court system or some other system so that something can be done about it. 
 Many of the offenders whom I have met have problems that are associated with, but go beyond, their addiction to class A drugs. That is not to say that all people who use those substances commit offences, but in my experience and that of people with whom I have discussed the issue, there is a correlation. The question is whether something will be done to pick those people up. A community order, or indeed any punishment that intends to rehabilitate, requires the co-operation of the offender. It must also encourage him to apply his mind to the nature of the offences that he has committed, the reasons why he committed them and their impact on other people. That is one of the principal bases of the rehabilitation aspects of community orders and other sentences. 
 If someone regularly turns up to carry out their community order or sentence when they are under the influence of alcohol from drinking binges the night before, or if the mind of a regular and dependent cannabis user is permanently influenced by the substance, that person is in a very bad state to 
 undertake any community order with profit. It is most unlikely that the minds of such people will be sufficiently clear to enable them to apply themselves to their rehabilitation and to understanding the reasons for their crime, as community orders envisage. The reasons why such people commit crimes may have nothing to do with their cannabis addiction, but if someone is regularly using cannabis while undergoing a community order and the fact is not being picked up, the process will not work well. In those circumstances, we should keep open the possibility of testing for other substances. 
 To return to what I said to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, when I wrongly started to talk to my amendments although I should have been discussing his, whether the proposal is valuable depends on what is done if drug abuse is picked up. If drug testing is merely a way of humiliating people going though the court process, it is not a good idea. As my hon. Friend the Member for Witney said, some judges will not know what to do with the information if they get it, which might be compelling grounds for not taking the suggested approach. I shall certainly not press the amendment to a vote, because it was tabled as a probing amendment. The Government want to tackle crime in its generality, and I fully support them in that. They want to take an overall view. There is a great meeting of minds between political parties about the conveyor belt of crime, the problems of societal breakdown that lead to crime and the need to address those problems and not simply to say that people must be punished. Punishment serves little purpose, particularly with the young, unless one puts programmes in place to integrate them into society, make them feel valued, and make them able to participate, to get work and to sustain jobs. We are not doing those things. We are not going about it the right way. 
 The use of addictive substances that affect one's reasoning is an important issue, and that is why I tabled the amendment. I do not intend to press it to a Division. I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but I hope that the Government will continue to bear in mind what I have said. I hope also that they will continue to study evidence from foreign countries, where such issues are taken much more seriously and where they are treated as a public health matter.

David Heath: Clearly we agree about the need for proper rehabilitation measures. Does the hon. Gentleman agree also that young people will not be done a great service by a court order that requires them to attend a programme that is essentially adult-focused rather than child-focused? That would probably have a deleterious rather than a positive effect. The Government need to develop appropriate child-focused treatment centres to deal with the problems of that age group.

Dominic Grieve: I agree. I would expect it to be common ground among us that it is desirable—the Government accept it, even with class C and B drugs—to discourage people from using drugs. For that matter, the Government discourage people from smoking and from drinking excessive quantities of alcohol. All those
 things tie together. They are important public health issues, but they have a link with societal breakdown and crime. I do not want to overstress the point, but we all want the same.
 I rather hope that no Committee member is addicted to anything, but that makes it difficult for us to understand how hard it can be for someone who is addicted, whether psychologically or physically, to escape that dependency. The problem in this country is that although we intervene, we do not put in sufficient resources to deal with the underlying problem. In contrast, drug rehabilitation in the United States, including rehabilitation for people who consider themselves to be psychologically dependent on cannabis, is taken very seriously. Resources are put into rehabilitation because most people come into the system through the criminal justice system, and the breaking of their addiction is seen as a key element in ensuring that reoffending does not occur. That is not necessarily because offending is acquisitive, but because if the brain is not properly engaged people have distorted cognitive perceptions. It is as simple as that. 
 We are a long way from that. In fairness to the Minister, however, even amending clause 145 as I propose would not solve the problem. The problem is not what happens under the clause but what happens afterwards. However, I wanted to highlight the issue because it is of great importance. Just as parents pick up on their children's problems when they first go to primary school—that is their first impression of whether the children have adjusted—so, when people start coming through the court system, we should remember that we are dealing with the young and place an emphasis on their welfare. The Minister does want that, as we have seen from other parts of the Bill, but we are missing the opportunity to pick up on what may be serious underlying problems—problems that may be independent of the crimes that those youngsters have committed but may be closely linked to their ability to live as involved and adjusted members of society. If that is what the Government want to achieve, we may be missing an opportunity. That said, this was a probing amendment, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw it. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 547, in
clause 145, page 81, line 17, leave out '16' and insert '17'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 625, in 
clause 145, page 81, line 17, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Government amendment No. 548. 
 Amendment No. 654, in 
clause 145, page 81, line 30, leave out '16' and insert '18'.
 Government amendments Nos. 569, 570, 591 and 592.

Hilary Benn: This series of amendments would make the age at which an appropriate adult should be present consistent with the age on which the Committee agreed when it debated clause 10. It is clearly preferable that we have a consistent policy across the piece, and we debated clause 10 at great length, although not all hon. Members concurred. However, it would clearly be appropriate to make the Bill consistent by amending the present provisions on drug testing and treatment.

Humfrey Malins: I want to speak to amendment No. 625. It would be an unhappy situation if one's 16-year-old son was the subject of an order for a drug test, but no appropriate adult could be with him. Boys of 16 or 17 can be very immature, and some have not reached puberty. They can be very tearful, depressed and stressed.
 There has to be a cut-off age in life, and 18 is generally all very well. What about these 16-year-olds? I have seen enough of them to know that I would want an adult to be holding their hand through virtually every activity that they undertook, because they are so vulnerable. 
 The clause states: 
''Where the offender has not attained the age of 16, the order must provide for the samples to be provided in the presence of an appropriate adult.''
 As I read it, that means that an offender who is aged 13, 14 or 15 and three quarters, will get an appropriate adult—but what happens if he is 16 or 17? The amendment is intended to find out. Should we not change the age to 18?

David Heath: I want to speak to amendment No. 625, and to amendment No. 654, which would have the merit of ensuring internal consistency in the clause if amendment No. 625 was made.
 We have already rehearsed the arguments, so there is no point in repeating them. There is a difference between the Minister and Opposition Members as regards the appropriate age. I accept that there is great merit in having consistency in the Bill, and I would be perfectly happy to accept the Government amendments—with the caveat that we simply do not agree on the appropriate age.

Hilary Benn: To answer the hon. Member for Woking, amendment No. 547 will mean that the 16-year-old will have to have an appropriate adult present, but that the 17-year-old will not.

Humfrey Malins: Why not? Cannot the Minister think about that? It is a fair question. Does he ever see the frightened faces of 17-year-old boys, who are very young and vulnerable? Why 17? What is wrong with 18?

Hilary Benn: The hon. Gentleman's original question related to a frightened 16-year-old, and I answered it. Now he raises the issue of 17-year-olds. In the end, one must reach a view about the appropriate cut-off point. As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, we have had that debate, and the amendments simply reflect the Committee's decision. They will ensure internal consistency in the Bill, and that is why the Government tabled them.

Humfrey Malins: If internal consistency, rather than fairness and justice, is the great objective in life, there is little that I can do about it. However, I happen to know that some Labour Members rather agree with me, although I shall save them embarrassment by not naming them. I can tell by their eye contact that they agree with me. There is nothing wrong with changing the age to 18. However, internal consistency is a byword in our lives and we must not worry about the merits of the argument, so I shall not press amendment No. 625 to a vote.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 548, in 
clause 145, page 81, line 30, leave out '16' and insert '17'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 626, in
clause 145, page 81, line 31, after 'guardian', insert 'or close adult relation'.
 We have argued about this point already, and I shall not take up much time, since I know that it is on the Minister's mind. The amendment concerns who is the person qualified to be with a young person. I was concerned that the Bill elsewhere refers to a parent or guardian, or, if the young person is in care, a person from the relevant establishment. I made the point a few days ago that an awful lot of young people turn up with cousins to look after them, or grannies or aunties. I wanted a wider definition, because I was not sure whether in this context the term ''guardian'' would be defined as a legal guardian. In 99 cases out of 100 the granny who is looking after the youngster, and who has effective control—rightly, because grannies are brilliant at that and do a lot of good work in the courts—might be excluded. I think that the Minister agreed about that.

John Mann: I ask the hon. Gentleman to consider the problem of second-generation heroin addicts, in which the grandmother is looking after the grandson or granddaughter, who has a growing drugs problem, and the mother is perhaps a chaotic drug user. Normally, and legally, she might be the responsible adult, but she really has no child care or family responsibilities at all. That is particularly prevalent in communities such as mine. When the young person is arrested, it is invariably the grandmother who goes to the police station. She is the key figure.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman is quite right and reinforces my point. In his community, and indeed in the community of the courts, it is statistically likely that the person turning up with, looking after, and giving bed, breakfast and supper to the youngster will be an auntie, a grandmother or a ''cousin''—something with a wide definition—or a brother or sister. This is a brief repetition of the debate that we had the other day. I hope that the Minister will be able to consider the point.

Hilary Benn: While the hon. Gentleman was speaking I was just refreshing my memory on the earlier debate. It might be helpful if I were to offer him the same reassurance that I did then. I shall be consistent by quoting my words from the debate on clause 10, in which I told the Committee:
''A guardian may include a close family relative if the guardian has in effect care and responsibility for the child. A close family relative''—
 my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw just gave an example on this point— 
''may not always be the appropriate adult to be called on, depending on how well or otherwise family members get on together. It is my understanding that if the young person says that there is someone whom they wish to call in, the police will accede to their wishes.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 7 January 2003; c. 165.]
 In truth, that is the most convenient way of finding an appropriate adult, rather than having to contact someone who gives up their time voluntarily to act in that capacity. With those safeguards and sensible interpretations, it would not be sensible to change the definition in the way that the amendment suggests.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 145, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 146 and 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 148 - Fixing of Fines

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 627, in
clause 148, page 82, line 42, at end insert 
 'and the circumstances of the offender'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 496, in 
clause 148, page 83, line 3, leave out 
 'the financial circumstances of the offender' 
 and insert 
 'the offender's weekly disposable income and his readily available capital'.
 Amendment No. 670, in 
clause 148, page 83, line 3, leave out 
 'the financial circumstances of the offender' 
 and insert 
 'the offender's disposable weekly income'.
 New clause 5—Power to increase fine— 
'(1) This section applies where a court has fixed the amount of a fine and the fine has not been paid in full. 
 (2) If it becomes known to the court that the offender has a higher weekly disposable income or readily available capital than was known to it when it fixed the level of the fine it may increase the level of the fine.'.

Humfrey Malins: Under the amendment the provision would read ''The amount of any fine fixed by a court must be such as, in the opinion of the court, reflects the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the offender''. It is a wider—I will give way to the Minister, as he may pre-empt my remarks; if he does I shall have only one more little point to add.

Hilary Benn: I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to subsection (3), which states that
''a court must take into account the circumstances of the case, including, among other things, the financial circumstances of the offender''
 The point that the hon. Gentleman wishes to deal with in his amendment is already covered in the clause.

Humfrey Malins: I noted that the matter was dealt with in subsection (3); however, what comes first is always thought to be most important. Our amendment would have been much tidier drafting. There is one critical point that I hope the Minister will consider. I spoke a great deal the other day about remitting fines and London fines, but the Magistrates Association has guidelines issued by a very important body that issues guidelines for fines. When looking at them I sometimes think to myself that they seem slightly unrealistic.
 In the old wild west, young men had to have a horse. The same principle applies to young men in London: they must have their wheels. Thousands of young men have beat-up old heaps worth about £60—at most. They are untaxed and uninsured, but they are the modern equivalent of the horse for getting around. The problem is that most of these young men are either out of work or not saying that they are in work, and up they come for the standard no insurance offence. They probably have not had an accident because they are probably very good drivers. That is where the guidelines for the fine come in. You might be shocked to hear, Mr. Illsley, that some of the guidelines suggest fines of £500 or £600 for no insurance. That is all very well for the Minister and me if we negligently fail to insure our cars, or the Government car in the Minister's case. I have never been uninsured, apart from one short lapse when I forgot in the 70s. I digress. 
 I merely point out that whacking an 18-year-old with a fine for more than 10 times what his car is worth leads to the problems that I outlined the other day. Perhaps some of those present could have a quiet word with the Lord Chancellor's Department to see whether it can do anything to take into account the circumstances of the case and the circumstances of the offender as he presents them to the court. That might lead to a reduction in the huge arrears of unpaid fines.

Graham Allen: The purpose of amendment No. 496 is to make fines more realistic by making the court take into account
''the offender's weekly disposable income and his readily available capital''.
 That ties in with new clause 5(2), which states: 
''If it becomes known to the court that the offender has a higher weekly disposable income or readily available capital than was known to it when it fixed the level of the fine it may increase the level of the fine.''.
 It covers not only cases of deceit or concealment by the offender, but any other change of circumstances, such as winning the lottery or the pools. I would be grateful for the Minister's comments on that.

David Heath: I want to speak to amendment No. 670. Just to show that occasionally I can point in the same direction as the hon. Member for Nottingham, North, there is a clear similarity between amendments Nos. 496 and 670. The hon. Member for Woking has
 already set out his concerns. Fines are becoming a less valuable tool in the armoury of courts, simply through the inability to relate them to the capacity to pay. I am told by Napo, the trade union for family court and probation staff, that in 1992 fines accounted for 43 per cent. of disposals for indictable offences in the magistrates courts, but by 2001 that had fallen to 30 per cent. Over the same period, the use of fines fell from, I think, 6 per cent. to 3 per cent. in the Crown court. The combination is of fines not being used as much and, when they are used, their not being paid, as we heard in a previous discussion about the level of arrears on payments. That is a direct result of the changes that were introduced and the abolition of the unified system.
 I do not think that we need to have a quiet word with the Lord Chancellor. Rather, we need to have a quiet improvement of the Bill, in order to ensure that the message is put clearly to those who apply sentences on how they might administer the system better so that the fine is realistic and the chance that it is met is higher.

Hilary Benn: Let me say to my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that I understand entirely the intention behind their amendments. However, the impact of the wording would be a narrowing of the scope of the financial circumstances that the court must take into account when fixing a fine, or, in the case of amendment No. 496,
''the offender's weekly disposable income and his readily available capital''.
 That is too restrictive, as the ''financial circumstances'' of the offender could encompass factors other than those specified. An obvious example of that would be debts. ''Financial circumstances'' is a more useful term, because the offender might have money or assets, even though they are not working. The full financial circumstances might therefore not be fully reflected in their weekly income. They might have capital that is classed as unavailable at the point of sentence, but that might become available during the payment of the fine. ''Financial circumstances'' is broader. 
 We do not think that new clause 5 is necessary, because it will in any case be an offence knowingly or recklessly to make a false statement of means to a court at any stage either prior to sentence or during enforcement. There is already a penalty for falsifying means information. The offender would be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, which is currently £2,500. Since there is already that power, there seems to be no need to increase the level of the original fine in addition to setting a new fine for falsifying means.

Humfrey Malins: This has been a useful and mercifully short debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 549, in
clause 148, page 83, line 11, at end insert— 
 '( ) has failed to furnish a statement of his financial circumstances in response to a request which is an official request 
for the purposes of section 20A of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c.53) (offence of making false statement as to financial circumstances),'.
 The amendment affects the fixing of fines. When an offender has been convicted and the court wishes to impose a fine, it must take into account the financial circumstances of the offender before setting the amount of the fine. Under section 20A of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the court can officially request that the defendant inform the court, in the event of conviction, of his or her financial circumstances, for the purpose of determining the amount of any fine the court may impose. 
 If the defendant fails to respond to an official request, amendment No. 549 would enable the court to make assumptions about his or her ability to pay and to set a fine regardless of the fact that it has insufficient information about the offender's means to make a proper determination. 
 The intention is to ensure that the onus is on the defendant to provide, on request, information to the court about his income and expenditure before the court considers the case. The provision aims to provide an incentive for the offender to co-operate so that the court will be able to set any fine at an appropriate level. Moreover, it is more likely that the fine will be paid.

Graham Allen: Are all fines now index-linked to inflation so that we do not have to keep amending the law?

Dominic Grieve: No, they are on a standard scale.

Hilary Benn: That was a helpful intervention, albeit from a sedentary position. The answer to my hon. Friend's question is no. They are set out in a standard scale, the details of which I have with me. I shall be happy to provide him with the information.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: This part of the Bill deals with fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on an individual offender. I would be happy if the Government were to introduce a similar provision for a corporate offender. We do not adequately consider the appropriate level of fines for corporate offenders commensurate with either the seriousness of the offence that may have been committed or the company's assets. I ask the Minister to consider whether the fining regime that applies to corporate offenders is adequate to deter inappropriate behaviour by corporations in future.

Graham Allen: Will the Minister take away the possibility of linking all fines to inflation? If, for example, we were to have another period of Conservative Government during which inflation was rampant, the fine would diminish in real value. Rather than having to keep changing every statute law, can we introduce a provision that links all fines across statute law to inflation?

Hilary Benn: The eventuality about which my hon. Friend is concerned seems remote at present. However, I take his point and I shall draw it to the attention of my colleague who deals with those
 matters. I understand what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome says, but you would immediately rule me out of order were I to respond, Mr. Illsley, because his point ranges much more widely than the modest but important provisions of clause 148.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 148, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 149 - Remission of fines

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 623, in
clause 149, page 83, line 21, leave out from 'circumstances' to end of line 26 and insert 
 'the Court is of the opinion that it would be appropriate to remit the whole or part of the fine, or compensation or costs it may do so.'.
 We are not having much success this morning in persuading the Minister to accept amendments. I urge him, with all the sincerity that I can muster, to listen carefully to the point that I shall make. Clause 149 deals with the remission of fines. Subsection (2) is unnecessarily wordy. My amendment could achieve exactly the same—and better—circumstances. 
 I want to leave out the question of compensation for the moment because there are big difficulties with remitting it. The wording in the amendment gives the court much broader discretion to take into account all the circumstances on the subsequent occasion. 
 Some circumstances might not be covered by the provision. For example, a man on a salary appears before the court in January and is fined £500, payable at £100 a month, with the first payment due within 28 days. He makes the first payment on 25 February, but does not pay a penny on 1 March. He is summonsed to come before a means inquiry and does so within a fortnight. The court then makes an inquiry into the offender's financial circumstances and discovers that he is earning exactly the same as he was when the fine was imposed. His mortgage and other outgoings are the same. He cannot produce paperwork to show that he has any other outgoings. 
 The court makes another inquiry and discovers that, although his financial circumstances are the same, he has a problem. A close family member is very ill and desperately needs an operation or a short holiday. The circumstance has arisen within the past few days, but the inquiry into the offender's circumstances is identical on each occasion. The court is caught by the procedure. Any sensible court will say that it remits the fine and the man should fix the holiday. However, the inquiry has been identical. Not a thing has changed—the person's financial circumstances might even have improved. Where, in that case, is the court's discretion? It is much tidier to use appropriateness as a test. 
 The Minister is smiling so much that he obviously has a technical answer that will bring more consistency to the Bill. It would be realistic to let the court state what it deems to be appropriate—never mind financial inquiries; they are two a penny. What is the problem with that?

Hilary Benn: I smile for a couple of reasons. One, the hon. Gentleman has identified. The other is that the more of the hon. Gentleman's contributions I hear, the more I realise that were I ever to appear before the courts, I should be more than happy to appear before the hon. Gentleman; he is clearly such a decent human being.
 I remind the Committee that the clause is only an issue if the offender is not upfront and honest with the court about his or her circumstances. That is what it is about.

Humfrey Malins: Is it?

Hilary Benn: Yes, it is. The previous clause makes that clear. In the circumstances described by the hon. Gentleman, the provisions would apply in addition to the existing wide power to remit, which—as in the hon. Gentleman's example—is based on a change of circumstances since the fine was imposed. That is provided for under section 85 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.
 As regards compensation, the amendment is unnecessary. Section 133(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 provides for the offender to apply to the court to have a compensation order reduced or discharged. There is not a similar provision in relation to costs. However, guidelines state that 
''an order for costs to the prosecutor should never exceed the sum which, having regard to the defendant's means and any other financial order imposed on him, he is able to pay and which it is reasonable to order him to pay.''
 In addition, defendants can make representations regarding the amount of costs, under section 17 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which should ensure that they are not disproportionate to their means.

Humfrey Malins: I am sure, Mr. Illsley, that you and I are both greatly comforted by the Minister's remarks. In view of the important debates that lie ahead of us, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 149 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 150 - Savings for powers to mitigate sentences

Graham Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 488, in
clause 150, page 83, line 44, at end insert— 
 '(1A) Section 135(2) does not prevent a court, after taking into account such matters, from passing a community sentence even though it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that a community sentence could not normally be justified for the offence.'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 489, in 
clause 150, page 84, leave out line 1 and insert 
 'Nothing in the sections mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (d)'.
 No. 490, in 
clause 150, page 84, line 7, at end insert— 
 '( ) Subsections (1A) and (2) are without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1).'.
 No. 491, in 
clause 150, page 84, line 8, leave out 'those sections' and insert 
 'the sections mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (d)'.

Graham Allen: The amendments would confer a clear discretion on courts to pass a community sentence even where a short custodial sentence would have been justified. The amendments are so obvious and rational that I would be staggered if the Minister were not to accept them.

Hilary Benn: The amendments would provide an extremely helpful indicator to the courts that, despite the seriousness of an offence or combination of offences, they should be able to pass a community sentence, provided that there are relevant mitigating factors. The new generic community sentence will, in certain circumstances, provide a punitive response equal to that of a short custodial sentence, and it can offer a great deal of flexibility in addressing the need to rehabilitate offenders. I am happy to accept my hon. Friend's amendments.

Dominic Grieve: I am delighted to hear the Minister say that; I, too, thought that the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North were a good idea.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 489, in 
clause 150, page 84, leave out line 1 and insert 
 'Nothing in the sections mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (d)'.
 No. 490, in 
clause 150, page 84, line 7, at end insert— 
 '( ) Subsections (1A) and (2) are without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1).'.
 No. 491, in 
clause 150, page 84, line 8, leave out 'those sections' and insert 
 'the sections mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (d)'.—[Mr. Allen.]
 Clause 150, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 151 - The Sentencing Guidelines Council

Graham Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 518, in
clause 151, page 84, line 22, at end insert 
 'which shall include as deputy chairman the Secretary of State for Home Department, or a person whom he nominates in his stead, and the chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons, or a person whom he nominates in his stead, who, together with the Lord Chief Justice, shall comprise the Executive Committee of the Council'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 519, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 24, at end insert 
 'and the chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons.'.
 No. 520, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert— 
 '(4) The other members of the council will include at least one of each of the following— 
 (a) a Lord Chief Justice of Appeal; 
 (b) a judge of the High Court; 
 (c) a Circuit judge; 
 (d) a District judge; 
 (e) a District judge (Magistrates' Courts); 
 (f) a lay justice; 
 (g) a Police Officer; 
 (h) a Probation Officer; 
 (i) a Prison Governor; 
 (j) a representative of a Victims' Organisation; 
 (k) a representative of the Business Community; 
 (l) a teachers' representative; 
 (m) three lay members of the public one of whom shall be over the age of 60 and one of whom shall be under 18; 
 (n) a representative of exoffenders' institutions; 
 (o) a local government/crime and disorder partnership representative; 
 (p) a legal professional, alternately a barrister or solicitor; 
 (q) a social services representative.'. 
No. 521, in 
clause 151, page 84, line 31, leave out subsection (5).
 No. 541, in 
clause 153, page 85, line 21, leave out line 21 and insert— 
 '(2) The Secretary of State, Lord Chancellor or Chairman of the appropriate committee of the House of Commons must first propose to the Sentencing Advisory Panel that it prepares a report and recommendation prior to any consideration of the Council—'.
 No. 638, in 
clause 153, page 86, line 17, at end add— 
 '(ii) the appropriate committee of the House of Commons.'.
 No. 687, in 
clause 252, page 138, line 8, at end insert 
 ' ''the appropriate committee of the House of Commons'' means any select committee of the House of Commons which the House of Commons may from time to time designate by resolution to be the appropriate committee for the purposes of this Act;'.

Graham Allen: I hope that these amendments enjoy the same support as the previous group. We have reached what I believe is the most important part of the Bill, as it introduces the Sentencing Guidelines Council. I may take a little time to introduce the amendments and explain their consequences, so I shall speak briefly on later points, but it is important to put a few things about sentencing on the record.
 First, ordinary people—the public, whom the criminal justice system is supposed to serve—do not have the foggiest idea of how sentencing works. It is incumbent on Committee members to do their bit to persuade the Government to accept certain sensible reforms—I hope to have gained consensus on them—so that members of the public can understand what sentencing is about and what individual sentences mean. 
 We all hear from our constituents, who tell us, ''So-and-so got off with a slap on the wrist'' or ''So-and-so was convicted of an offence, but he'll be out in a few months. It doesn't matter how serious the 
 offence is.'' There is a lack of faith in the criminal justice system, and much of it stems from our inability to reconnect sentencing with the public. The amendments are designed to allow anyone to navigate a route through the criminal justice system and to understand sentencing. 
 I am grateful that hon. Members from both sides of the Committee have signed up to the amendments, and they have done so because they want to progress the debate and to influence the Government and the judiciary. I fully accept that not all of them have signed up to every dot and comma, and most want to facilitate the debate and to help the Government achieve some reconciliation with the judiciary and Parliament on the issue of sentencing. 
 It is pretty obvious from recent events that the Lord Chief Justice's pronouncements about first-time burglars just before Christmas have prompted a debate. They were distorted by the media and by the reaction to them, but—if I may be slightly critical—he should have anticipated the way in which they would be interpreted. With a little more care and sensitivity, and a slightly more obvious presentation, he could have said what he did without changing the legal aspect one iota. He could have put things in such a way that people would have understood him, but fear and a lack of trust led the public and the media to react unfortunately, to put it mildly. Had he had the benefit of a wider sounding board—of others giving him sensible and rational advice before he made his pronouncements—the furore that broke out just before Christmas could have been mitigated. 
 In the same way, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary—again for all the right reasons—responded to the recent terrible murders of two young ladies in Birmingham with a reflex, saying that people who carry guns should go to prison for fives years mandatorily. That was a reflex that I shared. Regardless of whether it was right or wrong, however, I hope that all of us, and perhaps even the Home Secretary, will say after further careful reflection that we should not initiate new sentencing guidelines or statute law in that way. We should perhaps take a more steady, careful and rational approach, so that we avoid some of the pitfalls that have become apparent since the Home Secretary's announcement. 
 Parliament is the third arm of the system. Frankly, we are just icing on the cake and part of the ritual of government, rather than a serious voice in a careful and constructive debate about sentencing. I do not say this to flatter hon. Members, but I have sat through many of our sittings, and the expertise and ability of members of this Committee alone has been a revelation. They have brought to bear experience from their constituencies, from the magistrates bench and from a lawyer's point of view. The House of Commons therefore has a part to play in the broad field of sentencing. 
 There is good will on all sides—within the judiciary, the Government and Parliament—to put the issue in the right context. If we share the responsibilities and talk to one another, we can come to satisfactory arrangements that accommodate every point of view 
 and result in more effective sentencing. Having gone through a joint process, we shall all be the wiser. Above all, the public will have faith that things will not have been done in some dusty, judicial, archaeological excavation, because of a reflex, as the result of a push by the media to respond to a particular horrendous crime, or because MPs are sitting in the House and cannot be bothered to take such issues seriously. All those stereotypes are wrong, and all three elements, including ourselves, have to take the issue seriously. It is evident from the support for the amendments in favour of a restructured Sentencing Guidelines Council that people are beginning to do so.

Lady Hermon: My reservation about signing up to the hon. Gentleman's amendment is that it does not include the phrase ''representative of the community''. Does he agree that the real problem with the clause is that subsection (4) states:
''A person is not eligible to be appointed . . . unless he is a Lord Justice of Appeal, a judge of the High Court, a Circuit judge, a District Judge . . . a lay justice''?
 Few women or members of ethnic communities are members of those judicial strata, so the council will not be representative of the community. That is my problem with the clause.

Graham Allen: The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I do not seek to excuse parliamentary officials or draftsmen, but one could argue that the clause was drafted almost in a different age, given the events that have taken place since the Woolf judgment and subsequently. I hope that we are all a little wiser now and can use this opportunity to bring it up to date. It was probably drafted five or six months ago, but it could have been drafted 100 years ago. It is wholly lacking in relevance to those—all of us on this Committee—who want to bring together a coalition of interest between Parliament, the judiciary and Government. The hon. Lady's point is extremely helpful.
 In formal discussions with Members on the Conservative and the Liberal Democrat Front Benches and with my hon. Friend the Minister, there is immense open-mindedness as to how to proceed. Everyone wants us to get it right, so I shall not press any of the amendments to a vote. My intention is not to divide the Committee, but to create a broader unity in order to empower our Government representatives to go away and conduct any negotiations that they feel are necessary to reassure the judiciary and our parliamentary and Government colleagues that the Committee is finding a way forward on sentencing, rather than representing any vested interest or partisan group. 
 Amendment No. 518 is designed to make it absolutely clear that in future sentencing must pull together the three arms: judiciary, legislature and Executive. It makes it clear that the chairman of the Sentencing Guidelines Council shall be the Lord Chancellor and that it shall be his ultimate responsibility to ensure that the council works effectively. It also makes it clear—I am open to alternative formulations—that the formal deputy shall 
 be the Secretary of State or Home Secretary or his or her nominee and the second deputy the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs or the relevant Committee or his nominee. 
 All three of the vital arms will be represented on the Sentencing Guidelines Council. We want to force them, rather than using megaphone diplomacy, leaks to newspapers and pronouncements on the television, to sit down together. That is the least that we can expect of those three eminent people, who represent far broader interests. The provision is symbolic, but the symbolism is extremely important. 
 Amendment No. 519 is intended to allow the Chairman of the relevant House of Commons Committee to be included in subsection (3). That is to allow the House to decide whether it wants the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee—that would be my choice—or the Chairman of the new Select Committee on the Lord Chancellor's Department to become involved. Perhaps the latter would take the role as the nominee of the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee. That is an attempt to keep things broad, and to permit flexibility and allow the Minister to make the negotiations.

James Clappison: Will the hon. Gentleman clarify two points? Under the clause the Lord Chief Justice would be the chairman of the council; would that still be the case under the amendment or would it be the Lord Chancellor? Secondly, under the clause the members of the council are to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Are the amendments intended to provide that the more-widely constituted body would also be appointed by him, so that the Lord Chancellor would choose, for example, the representatives of the business community and teachers' and victims' organisations?

Graham Allen: Perhaps I inadvertently misled the Committee. The chairman of the sentencing council should be the Lord Chief Justice under the amendments. If I said that it was the Lord Chancellor, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
 I think that the Lord Chancellor should continue to be the person who makes appointments to the sentencing council, but amendment No. 520 specifies the groups that should be represented. The Lord Chancellor would no doubt take advice, as he currently does, on the relevant matters, and make sure that the appointee was someone representative. Perhaps there is a suggestion that someone might be intent on packing the body. I might digress here and talk about wholly elected or wholly appointed bodies; that might not be a good precedent, in the context of a discussion about the Lord Chancellor, so I shall pass quickly on. 
 The people suitable to represent, for example, victims' organisations, would probably be pretty obvious, and I hope that the advice given to the Lord Chancellor would be straightforward. However, if any members of the Committee think that safeguards or more clarity are needed, they should 
 make that contribution in debate, so that the Minister can listen.

David Cameron: In addition to advocating broadening the composition of the sentencing council, and ensuring that it publishes guidelines of the standard bands for each sentence—which I wholly agree with—does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that those bands should be debated every year on the Floor of the House? Perhaps that should happen more than once a year, because so many sentences will need to be considered. Members of Parliament, who are accountable to their electorates, could then discuss them. At the moment, all that we can do is discuss maximums and, occasionally, minimums. There would be no harm, with regard to accountability, in debating the guidelines and the sentencing bands that the council would produce.

Graham Allen: That is a helpful idea, but I warn the hon. Gentleman to be a little careful about wanting to involve the Floor of the House, instead of the appropriate Select Committees. I do not say that there should not be a debate, but both the Opposition and the Government would whip hon. Members in debates on the Floor of the House. We should at all costs avoid the House of Commons becoming involved in a bidding war about sentencing levels, in which someone argues for a standard sentence of one year for a first-time burglar, then someone else suggests two and someone else three. There will always be a more extreme case, so we must be sensitive to making matters worse. That would not preclude discussing the ideas further in a later group of amendments so that the hon. Gentleman and I stay in order. We both wish to discuss how we would best deal with those matters in the parliamentary context.

David Cameron: I am not suggesting that there should be a line-by-line vote through the House of Commons. However, there are many examples of debates that take place in the House. For example, we have a debate on the Public Accounts Committee, on outstanding reports or on estimates. There should be an opportunity for elected MPs with constituency cases to discuss in the House what sentences this grand body of men and women will come up with.

Eric Illsley: Order. The guidelines on sentencing and allocation come later in the Bill. It would be better to debate those issues then. We should remain within the debate on clause 151 and the amendment.

Graham Allen: The hon. Gentleman made some sensible points that, as you say, Mr. Illsley, we shall come to. We are trying to improve the situation; making it worse is not what we are about. However, we shall come to the matter later.
 Amendment No. 520 is about the composition of the sentencing council. The amendment has retained all those who are specified as being members of the sentencing council. The amendment would not throw anybody off the council; additions would be made to make the sentencing council a wider sounding-board than it would be if it was simply composed of the judiciary. Unfortunately, a closed committee of judiciary would—no doubt for all the wrong reasons—be perceived on the outside as being a 
 closed shop of judges advising the Lord Chancellor. There are no doubt other ways in which that can take place. However, those individuals would remain on the council but the sounding-board would be broadened. The judicial view would be leavened by the involvement of those other people that the amendment specifies. Some people perhaps should not be on the list, but I am sure that hon. Members can think of at least two or three who should be on it. Indeed, hon. Members did suggest representatives while I was drafting the amendment, for which I am grateful. 
 Other people may have a contribution to make, either on behalf of this place or on behalf of the Government. More pertinently, my list includes people such as a serving police officer and a serving prison governor—people who see what sentencing really means and feel that dislocation between the ordinary person and the passing of sentences. Those people may help to bring us all back together so that we can all work together to achieve an effective sentencing council.

Lady Hermon: I always have a difficulty with lists such as this. People who are left out feel aggrieved and offended. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman give consideration—perhaps the Minister would also give more consideration in his reply—to saying that the sentencing council should include an additional nine, 11 or 13 lay members who, taken as a whole, are representative of the community. That would be very helpful.

Graham Allen: That is a very helpful and sensible suggestion from the hon. Lady. For example, departmental officials would automatically think that the police representative should come from the Association of Chief Police Officers. I automatically think of the Police Federation. Perhaps they should take it in turns, or perhaps we should not even specify who should represent the police.
 My list is to show that the Committee feels—I hope—that the council's membership should be broader than merely the judiciary. We should not attempt, in any way, to tie the Minister's hands in any negotiations that he may need to hold after this debate in Committee in order that he can come up with perhaps 13 extra individuals. 
 We are saying symbolically that the sentencing council would benefit from having in its membership a serving probation officer who is used to doing pre-sentence reports daily and a representative of victims' organisations who can interject where appropriate about the way in which victims perceive a particular form of sentencing. Imagine if a representative of victims' organisations had been sitting with Lord Woolf just before Christmas on the back of the Court of Appeal case. That individual would have contributed some very sensible advice to the, by and large, sensible message that Lord Woolf finally gave in that case. 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.